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This box describes the most notable features of the latest 
update to the Banco de España’s macroeconomic 
projections for the Spanish economy. Compared with the 
previous projections published on 21  September,1 the 
current projections incorporate the new information that 
has become available since then, including the revised 
Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) estimates up to 
2021 Q2, the preliminary estimates for Q3 and the changes 
in the technical assumptions underlying the performance 
of the different variables (see Table A.1).2
Since the spring, the headway made in the vaccination 
process has helped to contain the spread of the virus and, 
above all, to reduce the number of more severe cases. 
This has allowed a gradual easing of pandemic 
containment measures and a progressive return to normal 
activity, particularly in sectors requiring more social 
interaction. Thus, after growing by 1.1% between April 
and June, GDP gained momentum in Q3, growing by 2% 
quarter-on-quarter, according to the National Statistics 
Institute’s (INE) preliminary estimates. This increase is less 
marked than anticipated in the baseline scenario of the 
September projections (2.7%). Coupled with the 
downward revisions to growth in previous quarters,3 this 
has led to a more unfavourable starting point for the 
current projection exercise than anticipated in September.
The pick-up in activity and employment has continued 
throughout Q4, drawing on the information available. The 
continued buoyancy of the job market has enabled 
effective social security registrations (i.e. social security 
registrations excluding furloughed workers) to return to 
pre-pandemic levels in November, in seasonally adjusted 
terms. This development confirms a key feature of recent 
economic events, namely that employment is recovering 
faster and more robustly than GDP.
In any event, available indicators suggest that the pace of 
economic growth has moderated somewhat in Q4 
compared with the previous months. From the productive 
sector standpoint, the weakness is somewhat more 
marked in the case of manufacturing, as borne out, for 
example, by the sectoral PMI, which has continued to 
reflect a gradual loss of momentum in the output of these 
sectors since August, albeit still at levels consistent with 
growth in the sector’s value added. The results of the 
most recent round of the Banco de España Business 
Activity Survey (EBAE) tend to confirm that turnover and 
employment at industrial firms have fared somewhat less 
favourably compared to other sectors.4 
There are various factors behind this slight moderation in 
the buoyancy of activity. First, the increase in demand for 
certain products since the onset of the pandemic has led 
to a global shortage of supplies of some intermediate 
goods whose production is relatively inelastic in the short 
term (e.g. microchips). This shortage, which has mainly 
affected industrial sectors and is, therefore, consistent 
with their relatively lower strength, has led to a significant 
increase in order delivery times and, in some cases, such 
as in the automotive sector, the need to slow down 
production. Second, there has been a rise in the price of 
certain products, such as energy products and some of 
those experiencing supply shortages owing to the 
aforementioned supply problems. This is dampening real 
income growth for firms and households. A third factor 
has emerged in recent weeks: COVID-19 contagion 
figures have been on the rise, first in other European 
countries and then in Spain. This has led to the 
reintroduction of certain pandemic containment measures. 
These epidemiological developments probably explain 
why the recovery of some high-frequency indicators 
related to tourism, such as air traffic, has slowed down 
over Q4.
Drawing on the information available, it is estimated that 
GDP growth in 2021 Q4 could have amounted to 1.6% 
quarter-on-quarter, leading to average annual growth of 
4.5% in 2021. However, there is considerable uncertainty 




1  See Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2021-2023).
2  The current projections also include information on the institutional sectors’ non-financial accounts for 2021 Q2 and take into account the revised 
annual National Accounts series of previous years. Although this last revision was released by the INE on 16 September, it could not be incorporated 
in the previous projections, as no quarterly series consistent with these annual series were published at that time (which is the data frequency required 
to prepare the Banco de España projections).
3  The INE revised the previous quarter-on-quarter GDP growth estimate for 2021 Q2 from 2.8% down to 1.1% and also made smaller changes in the 
previous quarters.
4  See M. Izquierdo (2021), “Encuesta a las empresas españolas sobre la evolución de su actividad: noviembre de 2021”, Notas Económicas, Boletín 
Económico, 4/2021, Banco de España.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 14 ECONOMIC BULLETIN 4/2021  QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY








2021 2022 2023 2024
%
Chart 1































REAL GDP. LEVEL (2019 Q4 = 100)




available for this period are still limited. Additionally, the 
information on the execution of projects under the Next 
Generation EU (NGEU) programme is incomplete, making 
it difficult to accurately estimate their contribution to 
growth.
Looking beyond the current quarter, developments in 
activity in the short term (especially during the first half of 
2022) will continue to be influenced by the factors that 
have constrained GDP growth over the most recent 
period. In particular, disruptions in global supply chains 
are proving more persistent than anticipated three months 
ago. An example is the significant increase between 
2020 Q4 and 2021 Q4, according to the latest round of the 
EBAE, in the share of firms reporting supply difficulties 
(from 13% to 31% for the sample overall and from 14% to 
51% in the case of industry). These disruptions will 
foreseeably ease throughout the second half of 2022. 
However, over the year as a whole, they are expected to 
have a noticeable impact on output growth, higher than in 
2021.5 Additionally, the information available points to 
inflationary pressures remaining at around current levels 
until spring, approximately. This factor will therefore 
continue to squeeze agents’ income and, with it, their 
spending power. Finally, the recent surge in COVID-19 
case numbers in Europe somewhat delays the prospect of 
a return to normal activity, particularly as regards 
international tourism flows.
These factors will be partially offset by other 
developments, such as the faster pace of execution of 
the projects financed under the NGEU programme and 
the maintenance of favourable financing conditions, 
which will continue to provide support for agents’ 
spending. Underpinned by these factors, growth in 
activity will pick up from mid-2022 onwards, as global 
supply chain disruptions recede, price and cost rises 
begin to ease and uncertainties linked to epidemiological 
developments are dispelled. In addition, export market 
growth will help further boost sales of goods to the rest of 
the world.
As a result, activity is expected to remain remarkably 
buoyant between mid-2022 and early 2023, before 
moderating somewhat thereafter. In annual average terms, 
GDP growth would stand at 5.4%, 3.9% and 1.8%, 
respectively, in 2022, 2023 and 2024 (see Chart  1 and 
Table 1). Under the projected trajectory, economic output 
would return to pre-pandemic levels in late 2022 or early 
2023 (see Chart 2).
5  Specifically, according to estimates, these disruptions could give rise to a reduction in the Spanish GDP growth rate of between 0.2 pp and 0.3 pp in 
2021, and between 0.5 pp and 0.9 pp in 2022. See Box 5 of this Report, “The potential impact of global supply chain bottlenecks on the Spanish 
economy in coming quarters”.




Compared with the September projections, these figures 
mean that GDP growth in 2021 and 2022 is revised down 
by 1.9 pp and 0.4 pp, respectively, while in 2023 it is 
revised up by 1.9 pp.6 The changes in the first two years of 
the projection horizon are, above all, the result of the new 
QNA figures and, to a lesser degree, of the slight worsening 
of the short-term outlook, higher energy prices and supply 
bottlenecks, whereas the changes in the technical 
assumptions compared with those used in the September 
projections have approximately zero impact. The upward 
revision in 2023 is explained by the reversal of the effects 
of the supply disruptions and the different timing of the 
impact assumed for the execution of NGEU projects.
Developments since the summer of 2020 point to activity 
recovering more slowly in Spain than in the euro area, 
despite the pandemic-induced contraction in output also 
being sharper in our country. Specifically, in Q3 the gap 
compared with the pre-crisis GDP level was 6.6 pp in 
Spain and 0.3 pp in the euro area. The less favourable 
performance of activity compared with our peers’ 
economies is partly due to the greater share of international 
tourism, a demand component that has been hit hard by 
the pandemic. However, domestic demand is also 
displaying less momentum in Spain. 
Developments in the main macroeconomic 
aggregates
From the standpoint of the composition of aggregate 
demand, the projected recovery will rely mainly on the 
domestic component. The external sector will also 
contribute positively to GDP growth in 2021 and, above 
all, in 2022. However, it will make virtually no contribution 
to GDP growth in the subsequent two-year period.
Within private domestic demand, household consumption 
is expected to be highly buoyant over the projection 
horizon (see Table 2). In 2021 Q3, this demand component 
displayed a notable lack of momentum, the net result of 
two developments operating in opposite directions. On 
the one hand, supply chain disruptions hindered 
consumers’ acquisition of some durables. However, on 
the other, the ongoing lifting of the restrictions imposed to 
combat the pandemic prompted a surge in spending on 
domestic tourism-related services. Over the projection 
horizon, the sustained recovery in the labour market and 
the maintenance of favourable financing conditions will 
continue to underpin household spending.
In the short term, however, certain factors that will tend to 
dampen private consumption will persist. These include, 
first, the rising incidence of the pandemic, that may affect 
the consumption of some services, insofar as it requires 
containment measures to be reintroduced, and may lead 
to greater precautionary saving. Second, high inflation 
may limit spending possibilities, particularly in the case of 
lower income households that earmark a greater 
proportion of their income to the consumption of energy 
goods, whose prices have risen the most. Lastly, global 
supply chain disruptions will continue to affect the 
availability of certain consumer goods.
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
NOTE: Latest QNA figure published: 2021 Q3.
a Projections cut-off date: 28 November 2021.
b Annual average.
2021 2022 2023 2024 2021 2022 2023 2024 2021 2022 2023 2024 2021 2022 2023 2024
Junio de 2021
December 2021 4.5 5.4 3.9 1.8 3.0 3.7 1.2 1.5 0.5 1.8 1.4 1.6 15.0 14.2 12.9 12.4
September 2021 6.3 5.9 2.0 — 2.1 1.7 1.3 — 0.3 1.0 1.4 — 15.1 14.3 13.3 —
PCIHPDG
Unemployment rate
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Annual rate of change
6 The differences between the current and the September projections are calculated taking figures that include all their decimal places.




Over the course of 2022 household spending on consumer 
goods and services will gain greater momentum as the 
production bottlenecks affecting some goods – such as 
vehicles – that are preventing demand from being met in 
full fade away and, at the end of the year, due to the 
expected steep drop in the inflation rate. 
As a result of all the above, the contribution of private 
consumption to GDP growth in the middle years of the 
projection horizon will increase significantly (see Chart 3). 
In any event, high uncertainty surrounds the degree of 
momentum of this aggregate, insofar as it is difficult to 
discern what proportion of the sizeable extraordinary 
savings households have amassed during the pandemic 
will be earmarked for their consumption decisions.
Among the components of gross capital formation, the 
momentum of residential investment will be boosted by 
the continued favourable performance of the labour 
market, which is bolstering households’ future income 
expectations. In the nearer term, the growth of this 
aggregate may be limited by the signs of construction 
materials shortages. Also, the deployment of NGEU funds 
will give further momentum to residential investment, in 
light of the allocation to housing rehabilitation, under the 
Recovery, Transformation and Resilience Plan (RTRP), of 
a significant proportion of the grants received from the 
European Recovery and Resilience Facility.
Investment by non-financial corporations will be driven by 
a series of factors over the projection horizon. Against a 
background of gradually subsiding uncertainty, these 
include increased use of installed capacity (which in 
various economic sectors already exceeds pre-health 
crisis levels) as a result of the recovery in final demand. 
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
NOTE: Latest QNA figure published: 2021 Q3.
a Projections cut-off date: 28 November 2021.
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Furthermore, business investment will be boosted by the 
momentum from the NGEU projects and by digitalisation 
needs, which have been heightened by the pandemic. In 
the short term, the momentum currently projected for this 
aggregate is somewhat smaller than three months ago. 
This is due to two reasons. First, the later implementation 
of the NGEU projects, which means that some of the 
momentum contributed by this factor to investment 
growth is pushed back to mid-2022. And second, this 
aggregate being held back in the short term by persisting 
supply chain disruptions and the adverse impact of higher 
production costs on profit margins.
With regard to trade with the rest of the world, in the short 
term the growth of exports of goods will tend to be 
checked by the supply problems facing some inputs, 
which are leading to delayed deliveries of orders for final 
goods, and by the signs of a slowdown in activity in our 
peers’ economies. Exports will gain momentum 
throughout 2022 as these factors unwind. They will also 
be driven by a lower exchange rate than the 2021 average. 
The continuation of the recovery in tourism flows will be 
hampered in the short term by the recent resurgence of 
the pandemic in Europe, which has prompted the 
reintroduction of some restrictions on international travel.
The current projections still envisage a marked recovery in 
exports of travel services over the projection horizon, after 
it was estimated that in 2021 they would barely reach 
35% of the 2019 level. In any event, in annual average 
terms, this aggregate will recover somewhat later than 
was expected in the September projections (see Chart 4).
Imports of goods and services will also follow an upward 
path in the three-year period from 2022 to 2024, in keeping 
with the recovery in final demand. As in the case of 
exports, growth of purchases of goods abroad will be 
constrained, in the short term, by the global supply 
problems. Consequently, in net terms, these difficulties 
will have a low impact on the contribution of foreign trade 
in goods to GDP growth.
In the labour market, the upward path of the number of 
hours worked and the employed will continue over the 
projection horizon. After reaching 7.4% in 2021, the 
growth rate of hours worked will gradually moderate over 
the subsequent three-year period to stand at 1.3% in 
2024. In step with the recovery in employment, the 
unemployment rate will continue to fall over the projection 
horizon. It will be below the pre-pandemic level as of 2022 
H2.
The general government budget balance will improve over 
the projection horizon. The reduction in the budget deficit 
as a percentage of GDP will owe to the temporary nature 
of some of the discretionary measures adopted to contend 
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SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
a The current effect is the difference between the change in the quarter-on-quarter rate in one quarter and the average quarter-on-quarter change in 
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7  In any event, a more granular breakdown shows that the rise has been sharper among non-energy industrial goods. For a detailed analysis of recent 
inflation developments in Spain and in the euro area overall, see P. Hernández de Cos (2021), "Inflation: recent developments, outlook and monetary 
policy implications”, XII Encuentro Sector Financiero Expansión-KPMG. 
8  Base effect is the name given to the purely statistical effect that arises because the year-on-year rate of change in a given month is affected by the month-on-
month changes, be they abnormally low or high, observed in the same month a year earlier. For a more detailed explanation of base effects, see “The recent 




with the fallout from the pandemic and to the cyclical 
improvement. Nevertheless, the public finances shortfall 
is set to remain at very high levels at the end of the 
projection horizon. Based on the paths projected for the 
general government budget balance and for nominal GDP, 
the government debt-to-GDP ratio will fall moderately 
over the envisaged horizon, remaining at very high levels 
in 2024 (113.5% of GDP, around 6 pp below the 2020 
level).
Prices and costs
As indicated above, one of the constraints on the growth 
of demand in the final stretch of the year has been the 
marked rise in inflation rates, which has proven to be 
much stronger than anticipated in the recent projections 
of the Banco de España and other institutions. Annual 
consumer price inflation, measured via the HICP, has risen 
from -0.6% in December 2020 to 5.5% in November 
2021, its highest level since September 1992. This 
upsurge has mainly been attributable to the sharp rise in 
energy prices (and, especially, electricity prices) and, to a 
lesser degree, higher services prices.7
In any event, the factors that have had the most 
influence  on inflation throughout 2021 are, in principle, 
predominantly transitory. The first of these factors, 
statistical in nature, is related to the sharp slowdown in 
the prices of some components of the consumption 
basket between the onset of the pandemic and the 
summer of 2020. This deceleration caused substantial 
base effects that have notably pushed up headline 
inflation since spring 2021 (see the blue bars in Chart 5).8
Second, the recovery in demand following the gradual 
easing of the restrictions imposed in response to the 
pandemic has prompted price levels in numerous HICP 
headings (especially in some services) to normalise 




somewhat. A third factor that has played an important role 
in developments in headline inflation in Spain has been 
the increase in electricity prices, which in turn is mainly 
explained by the sharp surge in natural gas prices on the 
European markets.
Lastly, as indicated above, the gradual reopening of 
economies following the lifting of the initial stringent 
restrictions imposed in response to the pandemic has not 
led to an immediate normalisation of activity. On the 
contrary, the emergence of production bottlenecks, 
combined with the higher cost of global maritime 
transport,9 has sharply driven up the prices of numerous 
commodities and intermediate goods. This increase in 
production costs has been most pronounced in the 
sectors that have faced greater supply difficulties.10
Firms have started to pass through these cost increases 
to the selling prices of their products. This could continue 
in the coming months, since the historical evidence 
suggests that production price increases are passed 
through to the HICP (albeit, in any event, only very partially) 
with a certain time lag.
Over the course of 2022, the factors that have fuelled the 
increase in inflation throughout 2021 are expected to be 
dispelled. First, the pandemic-related positive base 
effects will gradually ease in the coming months, 
disappearing completely as from spring 2022. Second, by 
mid-2022 the production chain disruption is expected to 
start to gradually ease; if confirmed, this will help correct 
the growth in intermediate production prices. Lastly, 
based on electricity prices on the futures markets, a 
considerable portion of the increase in wholesale 
electricity market prices should be expected to reverse 
from spring 2022.
In this setting, the year-on-year rate of change of headline 
HICP will peak between 2021 Q4 and 2022 Q1 and will 
then gradually fall back. Nevertheless, in terms of annual 
average rates, the HICP is expected to accelerate from 
3% in 2021 to 3.7% in 2022 (see Chart 6). As a result of 
the disappearance of the temporary effects mentioned 
above, the annual rate will fall sharply in 2023 (to 1.2%). 
This will be followed by a minor increase, to 1.5%, in 
2024, as a result of the performance of the non-energy 
components. Underlying inflation will peak several months 
later than headline inflation, and will then decline between 
late 2022 and early 2023 as the bottlenecks disappear. 
Over the last two years of the projection horizon, the 
gradual decrease in cyclical slack will give rise to a 
moderate but sustained increase in the underlying inflation 
rate, to reach an average of 1.6% in 2024.
Compared with the September projections exercise, the 
increase in the starting point, combined with the higher 
growth expected in energy prices, results in an upward 
revision of our inflation forecasts for 2021 and 2022. The 
inflation forecasts for 2023 remain virtually unchanged. 
The underlying inflation forecasts have also been revised 
up, albeit to a lesser extent.
Sources of uncertainty surrounding the baseline 
scenario
The macroeconomic outlook remains subject to a high 
level of uncertainty. First, the projections assume that the 
impact of the pandemic on economic activity will continue 
to fade in the coming quarters, before eventually 
disappearing. However, in view of the recent pick-up in 
the incidence of the virus (despite the major progress 
made in the vaccination campaign) and the emergence of 
the Omicron variant, other more adverse epidemiological 
scenarios – linked to a potential spread of more infectious 
and, in the worst case scenario, vaccine-resistant variants 
of the virus – that would require the reimposition of more 
stringent containment measures cannot be ruled out. In 
principle, the impact of these measures on activity will be 
more moderate than in the initial stages of the health 
crisis, in a setting in which economies’ adaptation to the 
pandemic has improved with each successive wave.
A series of additional sources of uncertainty, already 
present in the previous projection exercises, also remain. 
These include the doubts surrounding the degree of 
persistence of the current increase in inflation and 
 9  The surge in global demand gave rise to increased demand for goods transport. At the same time, the pandemic containment measures created 
shipping disruptions. See Attinasi et al. (2021), “The semiconductor shortage and its implication for euro area trade, production and prices”, Box 6, 
Economic Bulletin, Issue 4/2021, ECB.
10  See M. Izquierdo (2021), “Encuesta a las empresas españolas sobre la evolución de su actividad: noviembre de 2021”, Notas Económicas, Boletín 
Económico, 4/2021, Banco de España. 




production bottlenecks, the use that consumers may 
make of the savings accumulated since the start of the 
pandemic, the speed of the recovery in foreign tourism, 
the rate of execution of the NGEU programme (and the 
characteristics of the projects funded by it) and the 
possible scarring effects of the crisis on the business 
sector. 
As indicated above, the baseline scenario assumes that 
the current uptick in energy and many intermediate goods 
prices will be transitory. But the longer this episode of 
higher prices and costs continues, the greater the 
likelihood that it will filter through more generally to final 
prices, and to wage demands, generating more persistent 
inflationary patterns. Thus, first, if geopolitical tensions 
were to intensify, gas prices could come under renewed 
pressure in Europe. Second, although the pass-through to 
final prices of the higher cost of some inputs has been 
limited so far, it could become more intense if the recent 
supply problems were to persist.
The pass-through of increases in inflation to wage 
demands is the starting point of what are generally known 
as second-round effects, whereby increases in wage 
costs and prices feed through to each other. The 
assumption under the baseline scenario that this pass-
through will be limited is based on two factors. First, the 
multi-year nature of collective bargaining, which in 
practice means that changes in inflation and, in general, in 
economic conditions at a given point in time have a limited 
capacity to immediately affect the outcome of collective 
bargaining processes, since collective agreements are 
renegotiated on average every two or three years. And 
second, the low proportion of collective agreements that 
include indexation clauses, which link wage increases to 
inflation. In addition, in the short term, the degree of slack 
still in the economy will foreseeably be a further source of 
containment of wage increase demands, at least in the 
sectors that are lagging behind in terms of recovery.
So far, the assumption that there will be a limited pass-
through of the increase in inflation to wages is being 
confirmed in practice, although the available information 
to November still essentially reflects the wage settlements 
agreed in months when inflation rates were lower.11 The 
possibility that the current increases in prices and 
intermediate costs will prove to be more persistent and 
will give rise to a greater pass-through to labour costs 
cannot be ruled out.
The projections assume that households will use only part 
of their large stock of savings accumulated during the 
crisis to consume. This assumption is based on the fact 
that the bulk of these savings are concentrated among 
high income households (with a lower marginal propensity 
to consume) and that most of the expenditure that did not 
materialise during the pandemic (on services such as 
dining out and leisure) owing to the restrictions in place 
cannot be easily deferred. Nevertheless, despite these 
mitigating factors, the possibility that the savings 
accumulated during the crisis may be spent on consumer 
goods and services in a higher proportion than that 
considered in the baseline scenario cannot be ruled out.
It is also possible that, should a definitive solution to the 
health crisis emerge, tourist flows from the rest of the 
world may recover more rapidly. Or on the downside, that 
the pandemic could lead to more lasting changes in 
business travel that would stall the recovery, although this 
effect would be limited, given that tourism exports of this 
kind account for a low share of the total.
A further factor of uncertainty is associated with the 
multiplier effect on activity of the NGEU projects and with 
their distribution over time (which has a significant impact 
on the GDP growth profile).
Lastly, high uncertainty also remains as to the scale of the 
long-lasting scarring that COVID-19 may have left in terms 
of structural unemployment and destruction of the 
productive system. So far, the perceived effectiveness of 
the policies deployed to prevent these effects underpins 
the assumption made in these projections that, on 
aggregate, the scarring effect will be limited. Some signs 
of deterioration of firms’ solvency have been detected, 
concentrated essentially in the sectors most affected by 
the pandemic, such as some deterioration of credit quality 
in some bank loan portfolios and an increase in the 
number of firms subject to insolvency proceedings. 
However, by contrast, the latest data reflect a moderation 
of these trends.
11  Specifically, to November, the average increase agreed for 2021 was 1.5%, 0.3 pp lower than that agreed for 2020. However, the latest collective 
agreements signed reflect an increase from 1.1% in 2020 to 1.5% in 2021.





Assumptions underlying the projections
The construction of projections is based on the fulfilment 
of certain assumptions about the trajectory of a set of 
variables relating to the Spanish economy’s external 
markets for goods and services, prices in the financial and 
commodity markets and fiscal policy. The assumptions 
regarding Spain’s export markets and competitors’ prices 
in domestic currencies, based on information up to 
25  November, were taken from the Eurosystem staff 
macroeconomic projections for the euro area, December 
2021. The assumptions regarding the paths of interest 
rates, exchange rates and oil and other commodity prices 
are based on the prices observed in the respective 
markets in the 10 working days prior to the cut-off date for 
each year’s projections (in this case, 28 November). In the 
specific case of exchange rates, the spot market rate is 
used. For the other variables, the values observed in the 
futures markets for each point in time of the projection 
horizon are considered.
In comparison with the September projections, some 
notable changes to the assumptions used for the baseline 
scenario have been made. First, the projected evolution 
for export markets in 2021 and 2022 is now somewhat 
less favourable than had been anticipated three months 
ago, with growth rates revised downwards by around 1 pp 
in both years. In contrast, higher growth is now expected 
in 2023 (1.7 pp). These revisions in terms of annual 
averages reflect less positive developments in the most 
recent period than had been anticipated three months 
ago. Meanwhile, the outlook for the period running from 
mid-2022 to mid-2023 is somewhat more encouraging, 
and has barely changed in the second half of this past 
year.
SOURCES: Banco de España and ECB.
a Cut-off date for assumptions: 25 November 2021 for Spain's export markets and 28 November 2021 for all other variables. Figures expressed as 
levels are annual averages; figures expressed as rates are calculated on the basis of the related annual averages.
b The differences are in rates for export markets, levels for oil prices and the dollar/euro exchange rate, percentages for the nominal effective 
exchange rate and percentage points for interest rates.
c The assumptions regarding the behaviour of Spain's export markets presented in the table are obtained from the December 2021 ECB staff 
macroeconomic projections for the euro area.
d A positive percentage change in the nominal effective exchange rate denotes an appreciation of the euro.
e For the projection period, the figures in the table are technical assumptions, prepared following the Eurosystem’s methodology. These assumptions 
are based on futures market prices or on proxies thereof and should not be interpreted as a Eurosystem prediction as to the course of these 
variables.
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2021 2022 2023
7.11.1-9.0-2.35.53.53.87.01-)c( stekram tropxe s'niapS
0.74.80.34.963.275.778.175.14 )level( lerrab/srallod ni ecirp liO
Monetary and financial conditions
50.0-50.0-10.0-31.131.131.181.141.1)level( etar egnahcxe orue/ralloD    
    Nominal effective exchange rate against 
    non-euro area (d)
    (2000 = 100) 117.8 120.7 116.7 116.7 116.7 -0.8 -4.1 -4.1
    Short-term interest rates
    (3-month EURIBOR) (e) -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
    Long-term interest rates
    (10-year Spanish government bond yield) (e) 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
Difference between the current 
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Second, oil prices are now higher than anticipated in 
September. On average, after reaching $72 this year, the 
price of a barrel of crude oil is expected to stand at $77.5 
in 2022 before falling to $72.3 in 2023 (representing 
upward revisions of 12% and 11%, respectively, with 
respect to the assumption used in September). In 2024, it 
is expected to stand at $69.4. Meanwhile, the euro 
exchange rate has depreciated in the last three months on 
the spot markets (by around 5% both against the dollar 
and in nominal effective terms). 
The other changes to the external assumptions used in 
September are more modest and, consequently, have a 
smaller impact on the projections. In particular, the yields 
on 10-year bonds traded on sovereign debt markets prior 
to the cut-off date for these projections are similar to 
those in September for the projection horizon overall. 
Specifically, this variable is expected to stand, on average, 
at 0.4%, 0.6%, 0.8% and 1.1% in 2021, 2022, 2023 and 
2024, respectively. Moreover, the slightly upward path 
projected by the financial markets for short-term interest 
rates is now somewhat steeper than three months ago. 
Specifically, the 3-month EURIBOR is expected to 
increase from -0.5% in 2021 to -0.2% in 2023, before 
rising to 0% in 2024. 
Also, explicit assumptions on electricity prices have been 
used, since the scale of their recent increase has 
implications of some significance for the macroeconomic 
outlook. Specifically, the assumptions prepared have 
taken into consideration prices on the futures wholesale 
markets until end-2022. However, since information on 
such market prices for 2023 and 2024 is in short supply, a 
relatively neutral assumption has been used (as in 
September), based on month-on-month price increases 
equal to the average observed in pre-pandemic years.
On the fiscal policy front, the main new developments 
with respect to September come from the draft 2022 
State Budget, currently before the Senate, and the 2022 
draft budgetary plan, sent to Brussels in October. 
In particular, the State Budget includes provision for a 
compensatory pension payment, to be calculated based on 
the positive difference between the average inflation for the 
twelve-month period running from December 2020 through 
November 2021 and the 0.9% increase approved at the start 
of the year. This payment would come on top of the 2022 
increase under the new mechanism envisaged in the Law 
guaranteeing the purchasing power of pensions (currently 
before Parliament), which provides that pensions will increase 
annually in line with the average inflation rate for the twelve-
month period ending in November of the preceding year. 
According to the inflation figures available up to November, 
the 2021 compensation will account for an additional amount 
of 1.6% and a spending increase of 0.2 pp of GDP, payable 
in 2022 but impacting on the National Accounts in 2021. 
The projections for this year also include the latest 
available budget outturn information published by the 
National Audit Office. Worth noting in this regard is the 
notable increase in revenue (and, in particular, in tax take), 
leading to an upward revision of their estimated growth 
for the year. 
Overall, the updated information on revenue and 
expenditure yields a slightly lower general government 
budget deficit in 2021 than was expected in September. In 
addition, the assumption regarding the impact of NGEU 
expenditure for REACT-EU on the budget balance for this 
year has changed. According to the latest information 
available, the impact will ultimately be zero.12 This 
represents an improvement of 0.2 pp in the 2021 general 
government balance. Conversely, the downward revision 
to nominal GDP forecast for this year raises the budget 
deficit as a percentage of GDP by 0.1 pp.
The increases envisaged in the Stage Budget (2% to the 
public sector wage bill and 3% to minimum pensions13) 
have been included for 2022. On the revenue side, the 
changes have little relevance in quantitative terms. In any 
event, it is assumed that a large part of the exceptional 
rise in the revenue-to-GDP ratio recorded in 2021 will be 
reversed in 2022 and 2023.
12  The information available in September suggested that the portion of NGEU corresponding to the REACT-EU programme would be accounted for in 
the same way as EU structural funds, which, while not affecting the long-term deficit, do have an impact in specific years, owing to the lag between 
the recognition of expenditure and revenue. This was the assumption made in September, in line with the Independent Authority for Fiscal 
Responsibility and the information from regional governments. However, the National Audit Office has recently announced that the criteria to be 
applied to REACT-EU will be the same as that for NGEU overall. The relevant revenue and expenditure will therefore be booked in such a way as to 
have no impact on the National Accounts deficit in any year, as per the Eurostat guidelines.
13  As opposed to the 2.5% general increase to pensions, based on average inflation up to November 2021, as noted above.




Meanwhile, in terms of the projects to be financed using 
NGEU funds, expenditure in 2021, 2022 and 2023 has 
been revised downwards somewhat and pushed back 
to 2024. Given the scarcity (at this point in time) of 
official figures on the implementation of such projects, 
information on the calls for applications arranged, as 
detailed on the Recovery, Transformation and Resilience 
Plan (RTRP) website, has been taken into account, 
together with certain assumptions made regarding the 
implementation schedule. Based on current 
assumptions, NGEU is expected to have a 1.6 pp impact 
on the estimated GDP growth rate for 2022 (0.3 pp in 
2021).
For the other variables and years, the projections are 
based on the standard technical assumptions. Thus, 
items subject to greater discretionality (such as 
procurement) are expected to evolve in line with the 
growth potential of the Spanish economy. Government 
investment and the capital transfers paid are essentially 
determined by the assumptions made with respect to 
NGEU, while government revenue, pension expenditure, 
unemployment benefits and interest payments will be 
shaped by the usual determinants.14
In light of these assumptions and forecasts for the fiscal 
variables, and given the output gap estimated in a manner 
consistent with the other macroeconomic projections, the 
fiscal policy stance, measured as the change in the 
primary structural balance, net of European funds,15 is 
expected to be expansionary in 2021 and 2022 (1.1 pp of 
GDP for the two years overall), before becoming 
contractionary in 2023 and, in particular, in 2024, as a 
result of lower NGEU-financed expenditure.
14  Specifically, it is assumed that government revenue will grow in line with tax bases, which mainly depend on the macroeconomic context. Nonetheless, 
a correction of the exceptional rise in the 2021 ratio of revenue-to-GDP has been included for 2022 and 2023. Expenditure on pensions in 2023 and 
2024 is determined by demographic trends and the planned indexation of pensions to the CPI, unemployment benefits mainly depend on how 
unemployment behaves and interest payments reflect government debt levels and interest rates.
15  While the European NGEU funds do not affect the deficit in accounting terms, they do impact the fiscal policy stance, since they entail a rise in public 
expenditure, albeit not resulting from taxes collected from resident agents. Consequently, to correctly measure the fiscal policy stance, the change 
in the primary structural balance must be adjusted for this effect by subtracting the change in the net balance of funds from the European Union.




SOURCE: Banco de España.
Figure 1  
SUMMARY OF THE MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2021-2024)
MAIN REASONS FOR THE REVISION
(compared with the September projections)
— Downward surprises in the economic growth figures for 
Q2 and Q3
— On the latest available indicators, in Q4 to date activity 
has been less buoyant
— Bottlenecks and higher energy prices persisting longer 
than expected
— Delays in the implementation of the NGEU projects

























— The course of the pandemic after its resurgence in recent 
weeks
— Persistence of the current global supply chain disruptions 
and potential spread beyond manufacturing
— Duration of the current episode of strong inflationary 
pressures, the possibility of second-round effects and 
direct/indirect impacts on activity
— Execution of the NGEU programme and the path of the 
recovery in household consumption and in international 
tourism flows
